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Major wars and battles play an important role in national thought and collective memory.1 
9 
10 From the Siege of Troy and the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest to Agincourt, Waterloo, and 
11 
12 D-Day, military campaigns have captured the imagination of subsequent generations, literary 
13 
14 circles, artists, and, more recently, filmmakers.2 This does not apply to victorious operations 
15 
16 only: the tragedy of defeat and the self-denying heroism of the defenders against 
17 
18 
overwhelming forces have fascinated as well – and quite possibly even more.3 Starting with 
19 
20 
Herodotus, the last stand of the Spartans at the Battle of Thermopylae has been dramatized by 
22 
23 numerous eminent writers and poets, including Lord Byron, A.E. Housman, and Heinrich 
24 
25 Böll. Lord Tennyson immortalised the ill-fated Battle of Balaclava in his ‘Charge of the Light 
26 
27 Brigade’, while the Battles of the Alamo and of Dien Bien Phu were made into films. In some 
28 
29 cases, these works conveyed critical and pacifist messages: Arnold Zweig’s novel Erziehung 
30 
31 vor Verdun and the Vietnam War film Hamburger Hill are typical examples. With regard to 
32 
33 
the  First  World  War,  it  also  seems  that  failed  campaigns  have  had  a  more  powerful and 
35 
enduring grip on the public imagination and national consciousness: Gallipoli, the Somme, 
37 
38 and Caporetto are some of the most important lieux de mémoire in Australia, Britain, and 
39 
40 Italy. In Canada, Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele are widely remembered – tactical victories, 
41 
42 it is true, but like the French defensive success at Verdun achieved at a very high cost. While 
43 
44 these battles have more recently come to exemplify the futility of war, originally they were 
45 
46 
often utilised to provide glorious examples of patriotism, loyalty, and the readiness to make 
48 
sacrifices in the name of the nation.4 Arguably, a similar tendency to favour narratives of 
50 
51 tragic loss and heroic resistance over stories of complete and utter triumph can be detected in 
52 
53 the case of the German battle myths of the First World War. Stefan Goebel has described the 
54 
55 Battle of Tannenberg in late August 1914 as ‘the most powerful German myth of the war’, 
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3 but  it  seems  that  in  the  long  term  the  victory  in  East  Prussia  never  reached  the  same 
4 
5 popularity and breadth of appeal as Langemarck (November 1914) and Verdun (February – 
6 
7 December   1916)  on   the   Western   front.5   It   has  certainly  attracted  much   less scholarly 
8 
9 
attention.6  Indeed,  most  studies  on  the  myth  and  legacy  of  Tannenberg  focus  on  the first 
10 
11 
Battle   of  Tannenberg  in  1410  which  resulted  in  the  momentous  defeat  of   the   Teutonic 
13 
Knights at the hands of Polish-Lithuanian forces.7 Scholarly books on Paul von Hindenburg 
15 
16 refer to the events in August 1914 as a major turning point in his life and the beginning of his 
17 
18 rise to popularity, but while the Hindenburg cult and the Tannenberg myth are closely related, 
19 
20 they are by no means identical.8 And although cultural historians and scholars of art history 
21 
22 have written extensively about the impressive Tannenberg memorial that was built in the late 
23 
24 
1920s, we are still lacking a comprehensive and thoroughly researched analysis of the role of 
26 
the battle in German collective memory, its narrative articulation, and literary and mythical 
28 
29 resonance. 
30 
31 
32 
33 * 
34 
35 
36 
37 
The Battle of Tannenberg (26 – 30 August 1914) was a pivotal moment in the initial stages of 
39 
the First World War. According to the Schlieffen Plan, the German supreme command had 
41 
42 committed its main military forces against Belgium and France. Anticipating a slow 
43 
44 mobilisation of Tsarist troops and resources, it merely deployed one Army to protect East 
45 
46 Prussia against a Russian invasion. Commanded by Maximilian von Prittzwitz, the German 
47 
48 8th Army comprised a considerable number of reservist units and was massively 
49 
50 
outnumbered by the Russian 1st Army (Neman Army), led by Paul von Rennenkampf and 
51 
52 
advancing from the East, and the Russian 2nd Army (Narew Army) under the command of 
54 
55 Alexander Samsonov, which was attacking from the South-East. Following initial encounters 
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3 at  Stallupönen and  Gumbinnen  (17  –  20  August  1914) and fearing  an  encirclement  by the 
4 
5 Tsarist forces, Prittwitz ordered a general retreat to the Vistula river.9 On 22 August, Prittwitz 
6 
7 and  his chief  of  staff  Georg von  Waldersee were replaced by Paul  von Hindenburg, who had 
8 
9 
retired  in  1911 after  an  unremarkable  military career,  and  the  energetic  Erich  Ludendorff, 
10 
11 
who had just made his name as the victor of Liège. The mass of the German 8th Army now 
13 
14 turned south against Samsonov’s troops (while Rennenkampf was advancing slowly towards 
15 
16 Königsberg). Hampered by poor communication, insufficient military intelligence, logistical 
17 
18 problems, as well as a lack of training and heavy artillery, the Narew Army suffered a 
19 
20 devastating defeat, resulting in c. 50,000 casualties and the additional loss of 90,000 prisoners 
21 
22 (at the cost of about 10,000 German soldiers). One of the few non-attritional victories of the 
23 
24 
war by any of  the  major belligerents, Tannenberg is  often considered  a  prime  example  of  a 
26 
successful  encirclement  campaign,  comparable  to  the  Battle  of  Nations  in  1813  and  the 
28 
29 German operations near Metz and Sedan in 1870. The extent to which it differed from the 
30 
31 Battles of the Somme or Verdun in 1916, for example, is obvious: rather than challenge 
32 
33 established notions of warfare, the campaign seemed to confirm the pre-war belief in decisive 
34 
35 breakthroughs and the cult of the offensive. Lasting a mere five days or so, it was also much 
36 
37 
shorter  than  many  other  major  battles  of  the  First  World  War,  ultimately  leading  to   the 
39 
liberation of German soil from enemy forces within a few months (Battles of the Masurian 
41 
42 Lakes).
10 
43 
44 Interestingly, the first German reports about the August encounter spoke of ‘a clash 
45 
46 between Gilgenburg and Ortelsburg’ or a ‘victory near Allenstein’, but it quickly became 
47 
48 known as the ‘Battle of Tannenberg’, referring to a small village several kilometres further to 
49 
50 
the West which carried much symbolic meaning and emotional value in German national 
51 
52 
history.11 It was here that the Teutonic Knights had been defeated by a Polish-Lithuanian 
54 
55 army in July 1410, and many Poles increasingly identified with and celebrated the event (here 
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3 known  as the  Battle  of Grunwald)  as an example  of  past   glory,  drawing  much  inspiration 
4 
5 from it for their struggle for independence.12 In the opinion of many German intellectuals and 
6 
7 publicists, on the other hand, this defeat had put an end to German eastward expansion and 
8 
9 
severely  undermined  the  standing  of  the  medieval  order  and  alleged  predecessor  of  the 
10 
11 
Prussian state.13 As Hindenburg later wrote in his memoirs: ‘Tannenberg! An event that is 
13 
14 still with us after more than five hundred years, signifying Slav triumphalism and a painful 
15 
16 memory of the German knightly order.’14 Against this background, the victory of 1914 
17 
18 appeared as a revenge for that previous national humiliation and as a final triumph over the 
19 
20 Slavs. In accordance with the widely-held notion of an eternal struggle between Germandom 
21 
22 and Slavdom, at least within right-wing and nationalist circles, the difference between the 
23 
24 
original  Polish-Lithuanian forces and the troops of the  Russian Tsar  was ignored.  Indeed, the 
26 
ostensible link between the two battles was quickly taken up and popularised by numerous 
28 
29 publicists and writers. ‘In a remarkable and most momentous manner’, the East Prussian 
30 
31 weekly Königsberger Woche wrote in September 1914, ‘this wonderful victory ties in with 
32 
33 that other Battle of Tannenberg half a millennium ago when the Slavs for the first time in 
34 
35 history succeeded in defeating our Volk and to shatter the bulwark of the knightly order in the 
36 
37 
East.  The  heroic  deeds of German men on the  blood-soaked ground near Tannenberg appears 
39 
as a late  revenge and triumph over the  impudent hubris of  Slav claims to power.’15  At around 
41 
42 the same time, the periodical started to invite contributions from amateur poets, who often 
43 
44 referred back to the Teutonic Knights, too, juxtaposing the two battles in the context of the 
45 
46 ancient Slavo-German struggle for supremacy in the East: 
47 
48 
49 
50 At Tannenberg 
51 
52 At Tannenberg in forest and marsh, At Tannenberg in forest and marsh, 
53 A proud heroic tale died away: A proud heroic tale began to appear: 
54 Jagiello the Masurian The Landwehr from East Prussia 
Defeated the German lords there, Fought three days and nights, 
The order’s luck and purpose vanished, And with streams of blood it quenched 
56 The commanders succumbed. The presumption of the Russians. 
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3 And the lands of the Balts and Latvians The German blade was far from blunt 
4 Fell into the hands of the Slavs, And chased the enemy into sea and swamp, 
The German sword in the East Defeating it heavily. 
Seemed to rust. We have redeemed the pledge: 
6 
Hail lands of the Balts and Latvians, 
7 
The Germans are back.16 
8 
9 
10 
Most of these Tannenberg poems, published all over Germany in newspapers and 
11 
12 
anthologies, were of a rather dubious literary quality and demonstrated an aggressive and 
14 
15 triumphant tone. Like much of German Weltkriegslyrik, they lacked imagination and 
16 
17 originality, often following the simple patterns and established motifs of previous war poetry 
18 
19 from the Napoleonic period up to the wars of unification.17 Tannenberg poems usually 
20 
21 conveyed a romantic image of the war, referring back to the Teutonic Order, highlighting 
22 
23 
East Prussian suffering and heroic endurance against the Russian atrocities, and depicting the 
24 
25 
enemy troops as primitive and barbarian invaders, often employing dehumanising language 
27 
28 and speaking of a ravaging and almost unstoppable ‘Moscovite flood’, ‘swarm of 
29 
30 grasshoppers’, and ‘Russian beasts of prey’.18 In a poem focusing on the misery of the local 
31 
32 population, the young East Prussian writer Fritz Kudnig, for example, portrayed the Russians 
33 
34 as ‘predators’: ‘An ogre with striking flanks, / spitting fire in boundless rage, / and its devilish 
35 
36 paws / are oozing bright red human blood.’19 It is estimated that up to 800,000 East Prussians 
37 
38 
fled  their homes and  that 1,500 civilians were  killed  during the  Russian  invasion  in  August 
40 
and  September  1914.20  The atrocities against innocent women and children, the destruction of 
42 
43 hundreds of East Prussian villages, and the plight of the refugees were widely reported in the 
44 
45 German press and led to numerous expressions of solidarity and support.21 A particularly 
46 
47 ferocious poem, first published in the liberal Frankfurter Zeitung and frequently reprinted, 
48 
49 
was penned by the renowned theatre critic and journalist Alfred Kerr, who had become 
50 
51 
notorious for his jingoistic and bellicose war poetry and here depicted the Russians as ‘dogs’ 
53 
54 that needed to be ‘flogged’ and kicked back into Russia: 
55 
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3 East Prussia 
4 
5 Has your land, Immanuel Kant, 
6 Been overrun by Scythians? 
7 Stinking and brawly 
8 trudge dull steppe swarms. 
9 Dogs broke into the house – 
10 Flog them out! […] 
11 They must not prevail – 
12 Flog them until their skin falls in strips, 
13 Scum of the Tsar, barbarian scum – 
14 Flog them away! Flog them away!22 
15 
16 
17 
The notion of the Tsarist troops as dirty, barbarian, and animal-like contributed to the 
18 
19 
widespread popularity of the ‘sea legend’, according to which thousands of Russians in their 
21 
22 panic and confusion during the Battle of Tannenberg and the subsequent Masurian Lakes 
23 
24 Campaign had drowned in the local lakes and swamps.23 In many cases, this was trivialized 
25 
26 and satirized in poems, but also in caricatures and propaganda postcards as taking a much- 
27 
28 needed ‘bath’, quasi a civilizing act by the culturally and morally superior German troops. 
29 
30 
Another popular anecdote had the retired Hindenburg tour the future battlefield from his 
31 
32 
nearby estate at Neudeck with an artillery piece, thus demonstrating the general’s ostensible 
34 
foresight and highlighting his personal connection with East Prussia.24 
36 
37 Tannenberg thus appeared in a quixotic and almost archaic light, like a tale from a 
38 
39 bygone age that clearly differed from the modern but static and costly warfare on the Western 
40 
41 front. Ultimately, it was argued, the urdeutsch territory had been rescued by the strategic 
42 
43 
brilliance and leadership of Paul von Hindenburg who embodied the ancient Prusso-German 
44 
45 
sense of duty, discipline, and loyalty.25 As the Süddeutsche Monatshefte put it in July 1915, 
47 
48 the Germans had witnessed a number of ‘glorious feats of arms’ since the outbreak of war: 
49 
50 ‘Liège and Metz, Santa Maria and Antwerp, Soissons and Tarnów, Przemyśl and Stryi – and 
51 
52 we confidently anticipate many more. But none will be received more cheerfully than the 
53 
54 news from Masuria, from Tannenberg and Insterburg: because this campaign restored our 
55 
56 threatened homeland.’ Hindenburg’s masterful command would ensure many similar 
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3 successes  and  bring  ultimate  victory  in  this  war.
26  Even  Social  Democrats  celebrated the 
4 
5 victory  at   Tannenberg  as   a   ‘redeeming  act  for  the  whole   of   Germany’  and   described 
6 
7 Hindenburg as the  ‘embodiment  of  German resilience’,  a popular and formidable  ‘symbol of 
8 
9 
power and calm’.27 In a hugely popular account of the battle, going through at least twenty- 
10 
11 
four editions within less than two years, one author even went as far as to argue that ‘the 
13 
14 bravery and monumental efforts’ of the common soldiers were commendable, but that the 
15 
16 ‘unparalleled triumph’ was ‘solely’ due to the brilliant strategy of the ‘greatest commander 
17 
18 ever’.28 At school, teachers discussed the battle in class, especially in History, Geography, 
19 
20 and Mathematics, and presented the saviour of East Prussia as a ‘model of calm and sober 
21 
22 calculation’, of ‘determined and successful action’.29 Amateur poets and established writers, 
23 
24 
too, praised the general as an intelligent but down-to-earth man of the people and likened him 
26 
to  heroic figures  of the  past,  mythical and  real, such  as   Siegfried,  Arminius,  Blücher,  and 
28 
29 Bismarck.30 The Bavarian popular writer and war correspondent Ludwig Ganghofer, for 
30 
31 instance, after his first encounter with Hindenburg described the general as an unwavering, 
32 
33 hard-working, and awe-inspiring character: ‘Ten o’clock. Suddenly all officers rise. The door 
34 
35 opens and the Field Marshal enters, dressed in a comfortable litevka, serious, nodding a silent 
36 
37 
greeting. He left his work late and it is obvious that his mind is still preoccupied, but in his 
39 
gestures  and  iron  face  […]  there  is  no  trace  of exhaustion;  rather,  the  marshal appears as 
41 
42 someone who was outside to seek some refreshment, like a hunter who enjoyed an evening 
43 
44 walk. […] Suddenly all those images of destruction from East Prussia and the Masurian 
45 
46 Lakes flash before my eyes. And against this background I count myself lucky and blessed to 
47 
48 meet the German military leader who managed to fend off this devastating threat from our 
49 
50 
homeland.’31 Countless poems acclaimed the general as a national guardian, a symbol of 
51 
52 
German invincibility and God’s love for the nation, as ‘Russentod’ and ‘Russenschreck’.32 
54 
55 Even Stefan George, who had refrained from participating in the spiritual mobilisation of the 
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3 nation and the war of words, in a rare and rather untypical poem of 1917 celebrated the 
4 
5 arrival of ‘the forgotten and plain old man’ and his heroic rescue of the ‘Reich’.33 
6 
7 Although   war   poetry  remained   the   predominant  medium  for  the   glorification of 
8 
9 
Tannenberg,  there  were  also  various  other  literary  works,  including  novels,  short  stories, 
10 
11 
several theatre plays, and even a thirty-page rhymed epic. They typically depicted East 
13 
14 Prussian suffering and defiance against Russian brutality and barbarism – the author of the 
15 
16 battle epic spoke of ‘slavish wolves’, bloodthirsty vermin’, and ‘ghastly horsemen of the 
17 
18 apocalypse’ –, the momentous intervention and ingenious decision-making of Hindenburg, 
19 
20 and the total and disastrous defeat of the Tsarist troops, culminating in the liberation of East 
21 
22 Prussian soil and the restoration or rebuilding of German towns and ‘civilization’.34 These 
23 
24 
works  were   composed  by  amateur   and  lesser-known   writers,   such   as   Josef   Karlmann 
26 
Brechenmacher,  a  teacher  and  etymologist  from  the  Black  Forest  region,  who  wrote  an 
28 
29 account of the ‘gigantic battle [Riesenschlacht]’ of Tannenberg for the German youth. 
30 
31 Wilhelm Hermann Schultze (also known as Wilhelm Arminius), a teacher and prolific author 
32 
33 of books for children and young readers, published two works about Tannenberg, including a 
34 
35 spy story. Other examples include the Bavarian journalist and popular writer Viktor Martin 
36 
37 
Otto Denk and Adolf Vogeler, a teacher from Hildesheim whose Tannenberg play was staged 
39 
at the local theatre in October 1917.35 
41 
42 However, the battle soon seems to have faded from German public discourse.
36 
43 
44 Tannenberg’s appeal among broad sections of the German population during the early stages 
45 
46 of the war had stemmed from several factors. It underlined the notion of a German defensive 
47 
48 war against brutal invaders: a victorious last stand of self-sacrificing troops against all odds, 
49 
50 
saving not just a province but arguably the whole German East against the Russian threat at 
51 
52 
the very moment when the German successful advance in the West was stopped at the Battle 
54 
55 of the Marne. The victory was said to carry world-historical signficance, reversing the 
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3 national  humiliation  of  1410 and proving German  superiority over  the Slavs, achieved by the 
4 
5 military   ingenuity  of   a   new   national   hero.   Indeed,   following  further  successes   in the 
6 
7 European  East  and  in  view  of  the  stalemate  and  attritional  fighting on  the  Western front, 
8 
9 
Hindenburg  came  to  be  seen as a  guarantor  of  victory  par  excellence,  surpassing even the 
10 
11 
Kaiser’s popularity.37 In the words of Anna von der Goltz: ‘Many Germans wanted to believe 
13 
14 in a traditional war hero, symbolizing past glory, providing fatherly stability, embodying the 
15 
16 newly-found sense of political unity, and upholding the belief in eventual military victory.’38 
17 
18 Appointed to succeed Erich von Falkenhayn in August 1916, exactly two years after 
19 
20 Tannenberg, Hindenburg and Ludendorff soon turned the German supreme command into a 
21 
22 ‘silent dictatorship’, instrumentalising the Field Marshal’s reputation for the total 
23 
24 
mobilisation of the German home front and the continued struggle for a peace of victory.39 
26 
The  heroic  campaign  of  August  1914,  in  contrast,  became  an  empty  catchword,  usually 
28 
29 invoked in connection with the general as the ‘victor of Tannenberg’. For most Germans, at 
30 
31 least those outside of East Prussia, it clearly did not seem particularly relevant any longer.40 
32 
33 
34 
35 * 
36 
37 
38 
39 
After 1918, the Tannenberg myth experienced a renaissance, although it became monopolised 
41 
42 by the national Right which emphasised the loss of territory in the East as a consequence of 
43 
44 the Treaty of Versailles – even a part of the battlefield had become Polish now – and the 
45 
46 ‘long-standing struggle’ between Germandom and Slavdom rather than the actual events of 
47 
48 August 1914. In his memoirs, published in 1919 against the background of the Paris peace 
49 
50 
negotiations and border disputes, Erich Ludendorff stressed the symbolic value and 
51 
52 
significance of Tannenberg for the present, warning against a repetition of the shameful 
54 
55 defeat of 1410: ‘Will the German allow once again that the Lithuanian and in particular the 
  
12 
25 
27 
38 
40 
53 
10 
1 
2 
3 Pole  capitalise on  our helplessness and violate us?  Shall centuries-old  German culture be lost 
4 
5 forever?  … This soil was  not  saved just  to let  it  it come under foreign  yoke  again.  Heaven 
6 
7 protect us from such humiliation.’41 General Hermann von François, who had commanded a 
8 
9 Corps of  the  Eighth  Army during the  battle,  wrote  similarly in  1922:  ‘The  Tannenberg   of 
10 
11 
1914 is a victory of German being over Slavdom, a magnificent battle of revenge [for 1410] 
13 
14 that is almost unique in world history. And yet: the Slavic storm flood has invaded Prussia 
15 
16 again and Poles are subjugating Germans.’42 Such rhetoric, which resumed and amplified 
17 
18 anti-Polish sentiments from the pre-war period and integrated the Russian invasion of 1914 
19 
20 into the notion of a perpetual Slav threat to the German nation, was characteristic for many 
21 
22 annual Tannenberg celebrations in towns and villages, especially in the eastern provinces. 
23 
24 
The battle played an important role during the acrimonious plebiscite campaigns in Warmia 
26 
and  Masuaria  (July 1920), conjured  up to stress the region’s German character and its historic 
28 
29 mission as a bulwark against the Slavs. The speeches at the inauguration of the Tannenberg 
30 
31 memorial in September 1927 promoted a similar agenda. The foundation stone had been laid 
32 
33 near Hohenstein three years before, on the tenth anniversary of the battle. Privately funded by 
34 
35 Prussian-conservative and monarchistic groups, this largest German war memorial looked 
36 
37 
like  a  modern  version  of  a  Germanic  medieval  fortress:  ‘The  towers  connoted prehistoric 
39 
stone  circles;  the  fortress-like  structure  reminded  observers  of  the  castles  of  the Teutonic 
41 
42 Order or the Castel del Monte in Apulia, southern Italy, built by Frederick II of Hohenstaufen 
43 
44 in 1240; and the simple but elegant design revealed the influences of expressionism, 
45 
46 functionalism and Art Deco.’43 The memorial contained the remains of twenty unknown 
47 
48 soldiers from the Eastern front and was clearly intended as a symbolic bastion or outpost of 
49 
50 
German culture and independence in encircled territory.44 Wearing the uniform of an 
51 
52 
Imperial German General Field Marshal, Reich President Hindenburg used the opportunity of 
54 
55 the unveiling ceremony, which was attended by c. 100,000 people, to reject the ‘war guilt lie’ 
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3 by highlighting the German defensive effort against the Russian invaders and their allies. The 
4 
5 German people, Hindenburg declared, had fought ‘against a world full of enemies’: ‘It was 
6 
7 not envy, hatred, or  the will to conquer that made us spring to arms. … Pure in heart we set 
8 
9 
off to the defense of the fatherland’. He also evoked the ‘spirit of 1914’, thus emphasising the 
10 
11 
need for national unity and reconciliation: ‘In the countless tombs, which are symbols of 
13 
14 German heroism, rest men from all parties. Back then, they were united in their love of and 
15 
16 loyalty to the common fatherland. May domestic quarrel thus smash into pieces in front of 
17 
18 this memorial; may it be a place where all shake hands with everyone who is inspired by the 
19 
20 love to the fatherland and for whom German honour stands above everything.’45 Key parts of 
21 
22 the speech were later engraved on a plaque within the memorial.46 Despite the attendance of 
23 
24 
Chancellor Wilhelm Marx from the Centre Party and various cabinet ministers, the absence 
26 
of  democratic  politicians,  high-ranking  Prussian  state  officials (the  government  was  led by 
28 
29 the SPD), and representatives from republican and Jewish veteran associations was 
30 
31 conspicuous and underlined the national-conservative nature of the event. In subsequent 
32 
33 years, Tannenberg remained a right-wing lieu de mémoire and icon of German revisionism. 
34 
35 The memorial was hailed as ‘a national place of pilgrimage in the German East’, ‘a landmark 
36 
37 
and  symbol  of  German  ingenious  leadership  and  the  bravery  and  strength  of  the German 
39 
people’. As this völkisch author of one of the key publications on the memorial concluded: 
41 
42 ‘May this monument always remind us of those we have lost. … A lunatic peace has 
43 
44 separated this echt-deutsche, robust province from the motherland and handed over West 
45 
46 Prussia, Danzig, and Posen to the Poles. Always remember and never ever forget: We have to 
47 
48 have all this back and our German brothers in Austria as well.’47 
49 
50 
Hindenburg’s wartime popularity had survived military defeat and political revolution 
51 
52 
remarkably intact, and greatly contributed to his 1925 election as President of the Weimar 
54 
55 Republic. In line with the powerful stab-in-the-back legend, the national Right blamed the 
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3 ‘November criminals’ for the  lost war.  Democratic  political circles,  on  the  other hand,  held 
4 
5 the  Kaiser and  Ludendorff  responsible  for  the  protracted  fighting  and  excessive  war aims, 
6 
7 although  many  workers  also  regarded  Hindenburg  with  hostility  and  suspicion.  While the 
8 
9 
latter largely stayed out of politics in the post-war period, Ludendorff made no secret of his 
10 
11 
anti-democratic views. Sharing the revolutionary activism of the new nationalists, he 
13 
14 participated in both the Kapp Putsch of 1920 and Adolf Hitler’s failed coup attempt three 
15 
16 years later. In an attempt to dissociate the Tannenberg myth from Hindenburg and the 
17 
18 conservative-traditionalist ideals of the Wilhelmine regime, Ludendorff in September 1925 
19 
20 founded   the   so-called   Tannenberg-Bund, an  umbrella group of völkisch anti-Semites, 
21 
22 militarists, and advocates of a ‘Germanic religious community’. As he argued in his 
23 
24 
Tannenberg monograph,  the  battle  had  stood at  the  beginning of  ‘German  racial awakening 
26 
and German recognition of God’. In Ludendorff’s opinion, ‘the same secret enemies, those 
28 
29 suprastate forces whose plans I defeated at Tannenberg’ – in particular Jews, Jesuits, 
30 
31 Marxists, and Freemasons – were still active and trying to ‘crush’ the German people.48 
32 
33 Given his esoteric conspiracy theories, Ludendorff soon became marginalised within the 
34 
35 radical Right, falling out with Hitler and other nationalist groups. Having once counted more 
36 
37 
than 30,000 members before its marked decline, his Tannenberg association was banned in 
39 
September 1933.49 
41 
42 But Ludendorff was not alone in challenging Hindenburg’s status as the ‘victor of 
43 
44 Tannenberg’. Soon after the war, military experts had started to discuss the responsibility for 
45 
46 the successful campaign, often questioning Hindenburg’s individual merit and claim to 
47 
48 fame.50 Several former high-ranking officers emphasised their own role in the decisive stages 
49 
50 
of the battle. According to Dennis Showalter, even Hindenburg’s predecessor Maximilian 
51 
52 
von Prittwitz, who had failed to stop the Russian advance, ‘suggested that he was the real 
54 
architect  of  victory’.51  Max  Hoffmann,  who  had  been  deputy  chief  of  staff  of  the Eighth 
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3 Army, famously told a group of officers when touring the battlefield after the war: ‘See – this 
4 
5 is where Hindenburg slept before the battle, this is where he slept after the battle, and this is 
6 
7 where  he  slept  during  the  battle.’52  In  his  publications,  Hoffmann  showed  himself  more 
8 
9 moderate, although  he continued to criticise  the  various ‘fairy tales’ that  were being  reported 
10 
11 
about the battle: ‘All those stories are inventions. Tannenberg is not the deed of a single man. 
13 
14 It is the result of the extraordinary training and education of our leaders and the incomparable 
15 
16 efforts of the German soldier.’53 François similarly described the victory of Tannenberg – the 
17 
18 ‘most significant military encounter [Waffentat] of the World War’ – as the consequence of 
19 
20 the common effort, the bravery, and dedication of the German troops and their leaders.54 To 
21 
22 many Germans, especially conservative nationalists, monarchists, and war veterans from the 
23 
24 
Stahlhelm  and  the  Kyffhäuser  League,  however,  Tannenberg  remained  intrinsically  tied to 
26 
Hindenburg. The former General Field Marshal was still widely regarded as a symbol of past 
28 
29 victories and national greatness. For Paul Lindenberg, for instance, a former war 
30 
31 correspondent on the Eastern front and editor of a lavish commemorative publication on the 
32 
33 occasion of Hindenburg’s 75th birthday, he stood above party quarrels and embodied all the 
34 
35 positive virtues of the German people: ‘In his person, he unifies everything we consider 
36 
37 
German: loyalty, diligence, honesty, conscientiousness, and steadfastness.’55 
39 
The official Reichsarchiv account of the East Prussian operations, published in 1925 
41 
42 as part of the series ‘Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918’, proudly praised the victory as follows: 
43 
44 ‘Next to Leipzig, Metz, and Sedan, Tannenberg represents one of the largest encirclement 
45 
46 battles in world history. In contrast to the others, however, it was fought against a 
47 
48 numerically superior enemy, while both flanks were threatened by further overwhelming 
49 
50 
forces. This achievement is unique in the history of war – in Cannae, there was no threat from 
51 
52 
the rear.’56 This account was followed two years later by a richly-illustrated Reichsarchiv 
54 
55 monograph on the Battle itself, written by Theobald von Schäfer, a former Lieutenant- 
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57 Whereas the counterparts on Langemarck and Verdun had been assigned to the 
4 
5 young  right-wing  writer  Werner  Beumelburg,  whose  narratives  contained  several  literary 
6 
7 features  and  dramatized  elements,  the  Tannenberg  volume  was  characterised   by  complex 
8 
9 
military-strategic   discussions.58   Showalter  nevertheless   heavily  criticised  the   book: ‘This 
10 
11 
drum-and-trumpet  narrative  account,  constantly  contrasting  German  heroism  with  Russian 
13 
incompetence, invites dismissal as Weimar revisionism at its worst.’59 Indeed, Schäfer, too, 
15 
16 presented the victory of 1914 as a triumph of German being over uncivilised Slavdom, a 
17 
18 prime example of German greatness and singularity, and asked his fellow countrymen to find 
19 
20 strength and comfort in the ‘spirit of Tannenberg’: ‘No other nation has performed such a 
21 
22 great feat of war. – This cannot be a coincidence. – May this knowledge fill every German 
23 
24 
with pride and courage in times of hardship and humiliation, but also give him the confidence 
26 
that the nation which won at Tannenberg will resume and keep its standing in the world, as 
28 
29 long as it remains true to itself and its magnificent past!’60 
30 
31 Tannenberg as a national symbol of past and future greatness, evoked to distract from 
32 
33 and cope with an humiliating present, as a political slogan of right-wing revisionism – these 
34 
35 were the key features of the Tannenberg myth during the Weimar Republic. Compared to the 
36 
37 
flood of popular histories and factional military accounts of the battle, pure literary works 
39 
about  Tannenberg  were  extremely  rare  –  a  remarkable  observation  given  the  plethora   of 
41 
42 German war novels especially in the late 1920s.
61 Much of this Kriegsliteratur, however, 
43 
44 focused on the Western front, whether it glorified the combat experience and soldierly 
45 
46 comradeship, such as Ernst Jünger’s In Stahlgewittern (1920) and Josef Magnus Wehner’s 
47 
48 Sieben vor Verdun (1930), or expressed anti-war views, such as Erich Maria Remarque’s Im 
49 
50 
Westen Nichts Neues (1929) and Edlef Köppen’s Heeresbericht (1930).62 Indeed, there was 
51 
52 
not a single comparable work on Tannenberg. Apart from a few, fairly traditional poems and 
54 
55 a theatre play from an obscure author, the main piece seems to have been the relevant chapter 
  
12 
25 
27 
38 
40 
53 
15 
1 
2 
3 in   Werner  Beumelburg’s  hugely  successful  Sperrfeuer  um   Deutschland  (1929),   a  rough 
4 
5 account of key events of the First World War with the declared aim to ‘merge military actions 
6 
7 with  emotional  matters’.63  The  combination of  military history with  novel-like  elements  is 
8 
9 
evident  in  the  section  on  Tannenberg,  too,  despite  its  heavy  focus  on  the  operational 
10 
11 
considerations of key military leaders (including Prittwitz, Conrad von Hötzendorf, and 
13 
14 Rennenkampf). Several anecdotes romanticise the battle, such as the claim that German 
15 
16 soldiers sang the Hymn of Leuthen, which places Tannenberg into the tradition of 
17 
18 Brandenburg-Prussian victories. The author also tells the ‘sea legend’, according to which the 
19 
20 Russian troops got hopelessly lost in the woods and lakeland area: ‘The leadership fails … 
21 
22 Grinning, panic raises its Medusa head from the swamps.’64 Beumelburg’s Tannenberg 
23 
24 
chapter was later reprinted in a collection of poetic accounts of historical events. As the editor 
26 
explained, he wanted  to bring German history to  life and to make it  more accessible, allowing 
28 
29 the readers to experience and comprehend those past episodes and figures in a different, more 
30 
31 emotional and thus more ‘authentic’ way.65 
32 
33 Interestingly, Beumelburg’s popular military history carried a short preface by 
34 
35 Hindenburg and had in fact been approved by the President’s Office only after a series of 
36 
37 
amendments, including a more conspicuous depiction of his role in the planning stages and 
39 
during the  battle.66 Hindenburg remained absolutely central  to Tannenberg,  as evidenced also 
41 
42 by the various films on the battle. A first cinematic exploration had appeared in 1917 under 
43 
44 the title Ostpreußen und sein Hindenburg (dir. Gustav Trautschold and Richard Schott), a 
45 
46 chronological outline of East Prussian history since the Middle Ages that culminated in the 
47 
48 Russian invasion, the atrocities against ordinary East Prussians, and Hindenburg’s victory 
49 
50 
over the Tsarist troops.67 These two elements – the human tragedy of the civilians and the 
51 
52 
general’s strategic acumen – were core themes in subsequent productions, too, such as the 
54 
55 feature film Volk in Not. Ein Heldenlied von Tannenberg (dir. Wolfgang Neff, 1925), which 
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3 focused largely on the home front,  the  Hindenburg documentaries Der Eiserne  Hindenburg in 
4 
5 Krieg und Frieden (dir. Johannes Häussler, 1929) and Einer für Alle! (dir. Curt Wesse and 
6 
7 Heinrich Roellenbleg, 1932), and the much more famous Tannenberg, also from 1932. The 
8 
9 
latter was  directed  by the  prolific  Heinz Paul whose  previous  films included  pieces  on   the 
10 
11 
Somme and Verdun. While documentary military-strategic sequences dominated Paul’s 
13 
14 Tannenberg picture (although most scenes involving the serving Reich President had to be 
15 
16 cut at the behest of film officials), the fictional story about an East Prussian estate owner and 
17 
18 officer whose family gets caught up in the fighting added emotional appeal, suspense, and 
19 
20 drama – quite an exception among the numerous written and cinematic representations of the 
21 
22 Battle of Tannenberg during the Weimar Republic.68 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 The National Socialist regime never really rembraced the victory of 1914 as part of its 
32 
33 propaganda. Since the late 1920s, Adolf Hitler and his followers had been openly critical of 
34 
35 Hindenburg, branding the Reich President a puppet in the service of deserters and ‘November 
36 
37 
criminals’,   an   Erfüllungspolitiker  acting   in   the   interest   of   international  financiers  and 
39 
preventing   a   true   national   regeneration.   Given   the   difficult   economic   situation   and 
41 
42 polarisation of German politics, Hindenburg in his 1931 New Year’s address had called for 
43 
44 national unity by invoking the memory of Tannenberg: ‘Back then, our situation was equally 
45 
46 difficult. … But the bonds of mutual trust, loyal comradeship, heartfelt patriotism, and the 
47 
48 faith in ourselves held us together firmly, so that after several days of hard struggle the end 
49 
50 
result was in our favour. Facing similarly difficult times, I once again call upon the whole of 
51 
52 
Germany to stand together loyally and united in fate. … God has rescued Germany from 
54 
severe hardship before. He will not abandon us now.’69 Following his appointment as Reich 
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3 Chancellor in January 1933, Hitler pursued a placatory strategy to gain the support of military 
4 
5 and  national-conservative  circles for his agenda. The  reconciliation of  the  old  and  the   new 
6 
7 Germany was famously stage-managed at the Day of Potsdam in March 1933, but was also a 
8 
9 key theme  at  the  Tannenberg ceremony in  August  1933  and  Hindenburg’s  state funeral one 
10 
11 
year later. Both took place in the Tannenberg memorial and were attended primarily by 
13 
14 Reichswehr formations and veterans’ associations. Hoping to win over these groups – 
15 
16 following Hindenburg’s death the armed forces now had to swear a personal oath of loyalty 
17 
18 to the Führer –, Hitler and the other speakers, such as Hermann Göring, refrained from 
19 
20 accentuating racism and anti-Semitism, emphasising instead the reconciliation of traditional 
21 
22 Prussiandom and National Socialism.70 In this context, Hitler was often presented as the 
23 
24 
completer and enforcer of the work of Tannenberg, referring primarily to the inauguration of 
26 
the memorial in 1927 and the revisionist claim to the lost eastern territories rather than to the 
28 
29 battle of 1914.71 Indeed, the Tannenberg of the First World War did not figure prominently in 
30 
31 National Socialist discourse. Many obituaries for the Reich President mentioned the military 
32 
33 victory only in passing, often presenting Hitler’s appointment as German Chancellor as 
34 
35 Hindenburg’s greatest lifetime achievement and emphasising his role as ‘patron of the 
36 
37 
National Socialist revolution’.  As  Hitler’s deputy Rudolf  Hess declared: ‘Hindenburg’s living 
39 
legacy for  Germany is the  Führer.’72  Even  Hermann  Oncken,  an  influential national-liberal 
41 
42 historian and former supporter of the Republic, promoted such an interpretation. Trying to 
43 
44 assess Hindenburg’s European significance, Oncken argued that the victory of Tannenberg 
45 
46 had saved not only Germany but the whole Continent, which could otherwise have come 
47 
48 ‘under the influence of Bolshevism and its Asiatic methods’. However, the historian devoted 
49 
50 
much more attention to Hindenburg’s role as father of the nation and preserver of Prusso- 
51 
52 
German ideals in the difficult period after the Treaty of Versailles. By reaching out to the 
54 
55 National Socialists, Oncken maintained, Hindenburg had finally enabled Germany’s power- 
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3 political resurgence on the international stage, curbing French supremacy and thus restoring a 
4 
5 stable  balance  of  power in  Europe.73  In  subsequent  months,  the  Tannenberg memorial was 
6 
7 redesigned,  adding a  new emphasis  on the  Hindenburg crypt  and turning it from a  historical 
8 
9 
site commemorating the battle of 1914 into a personalized memorial for the former General 
10 
11 
Field Marshal and Reich President. Taking up an idea from the Weimar period, it was 
13 
14 declared Germany’s official war memorial (Reichsehrenmal), a ‘sanctuary of the nation’ and 
15 
16 ‘symbol of German loyalty, comradeship, and self-sacrifice’, as Hitler explained at the 
17 
18 unveiling ceremony on 2 October 1935.74 While these changes enhanced the status and 
19 
20 functional purpose of the memorial, they also removed it from its original historical and local 
21 
22 context. It remained a popular destination for school and study trips, but never again played 
23 
24 
such a prominent political role as between 1933 and 1935.75 
26 
Hindenburg’s death was much lamented in conservative circles, the Reichswehr, and 
28 
29 veterans’ associations, which continued to honour his achievements during the war, including 
30 
31 the Battle of Tannenberg.76 Despite some heated discussion about Ludendorff’s role, 
32 
33 triggered by his revisionistic Tannenberg monographs, most publications offered a fairly 
34 
35 balanced discussion of Hindenburgian leadership in 1914 and depicted him in a 
36 
37 
complementary partnership with  his  chief  of  staff.77  They often  praised  the  troops  for their 
39 
bravery and sense of duty, too, and rebutted exaggerated stories such as the ‘sea legend’. 
41 
42 Some military authors even even questioned Tannenberg’s significance for the overall course 
43 
44 of the war in view of the decisive events on the Western front. Anti-Slav rhetoric and 
45 
46 National Socialist ideas of racial superiority hardly featured in these works, which instead 
47 
48 celebrated Hindenburg as a devout and dutiful military leader, a brilliant strategist and ‘model 
49 
50 
of true German soldierdom’.78 Only Rolf Bathe, a representative of the front generation and 
51 
52 
author of several military accounts, seems to have challenged the typical focus on senior 
54 
55 officers and military planners in his 1939 book on Tannenberg, subtitled Der Einsatz des 
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3 letzten  Mannes.  Lamenting the  lack of  narratives that captured  the  ‘dramatic  experience  of 
4 
5 the  fighting  troops’  during  those  fateful  August  days,  he  emphasised  the  suffering  and 
6 
7 sacrifice  of ordinary soldiers  who  had fought  to the  last breath and  bullet:  ‘Here  fought and 
8 
9 
won the Volk in Waffen!’ It is worth pointing out that Bathe attributed ‘this most memorable 
10 
11 
victory in German history’ to the excellent spirit of the old army, the superior training of the 
13 
14 troops, and the voluntary subordination of the individual to the collective, rather than to some 
15 
16 racial qualities.79 Issued by the official Wehrmacht publishing house just before the outbreak 
17 
18 of the Second World War, his book – just like most other military accounts of the battle that 
19 
20 focused primarily on the strategic brilliance of Hindenburg – is an important reminder of the 
21 
22 persistence of conservative attitudes within German military circles and the limits of Nazi 
23 
24 
ideological penetration. 
26 
Literary works on Tannenberg published during the Third Reich shared this 
28 
29 traditional reading of the battle. In contrast to the 1920s, there was a veritable explosion of 
30 
31 publications on the battle, also by relatively well-known writers, such as Joachim von 
32 
33 Reichel, Ludwig Friedrich Barthel, Albert Benary, and Hansgeorg Buchholtz. Many of these 
34 
35 books were popular military histories, often aimed at younger readers and including maps, 
36 
37 
photographs,  as  well  as  quotes  from  historical  sources  (e.g.  military  orders  and  army 
39 
reports).80 Paul Coelestin Ettighoffer, a hugely successful author of war novels and stories, 
41 
42 also combined factual and fictional elements in his semi-documentary ‘report’ on 
43 
44 Tannenberg. First published in 1939, it went through eight editions within two years.81 Other 
45 
46 popular works covered both historical battles (1410/1914), thus underlining East Prussia’s 
47 
48 role in Germany history as an outpost or ‘bulwark of the Reich’.82 Ernst Moritz Mungenast, a 
49 
50 
writer and journalist from Lorraine, put Hindenburg – the ‘hero of Tannenberg’ – at the 
51 
52 
centre of his bestselling Jugendbuch from 1934 which experienced seven editions by 1943.83 
54 
55 There were also several purely fictional works with individualised storylines, including a 
  
12 
25 
27 
38 
40 
53 
20 
1 
2 
3 theatre play, a collection of short stories, and historical novels.
84 Using fairly conventional 
4 
5 literary  techniques   and  motifs,   they  typically  made  a   link   to  1410  and   focused on  the 
6 
7 martyrdom of the civilians, Russian barbarism, and Hindenburg as deus ex machina – rather 
8 
9 
than, as Bathe had demanded, the war experience of the ordinary soldier. Werner Treuenfels’ 
10 
11 
book from 1934, for example, subtitled Ein vaterländischer Roman and even introduced by 
13 
14 von François, centred primarily on the love entanglements of an accomplished tennis player – 
15 
16 an ordinary piece of light fiction that was a far cry from the captivating Frontromane of 
17 
18 Jünger, Beumelburg, or Wehner.85 While the remarkably high circulation figures of 
19 
20 Mungenast and Ettighoffer seem to demonstrate a continued interest of many readers in 
21 
22 Tannenberg, neither offered a novel and distinctively völkisch interpretation of the battle. In a 
23 
24 
preface  to  von  Reichel’s  historical  account,  published  in  1934,  even  the  East  Prussian 
26 
Gauleiter Erich Koch highlighted above all the decisive ‘old-Prussian traditions’ and virtues 
28 
29 of ‘loyalty, bravery, and dutiful conduct’.86 
30 
31 In 1935, a large passenger ferry was named after the battle, christened by 
32 
33 Hindenburg’s granddaughter and connecting cities on the North-German Baltic coast with 
34 
35 East Prussia. At around the same time, the Tannenberg memorial was depicted on a stamp, 
36 
37 
part of a rare and much sought-after souvenir sheet in commemoration of the large philatelic 
39 
exhibition  in  Königsberg  (Ostropa).  One  year  later,  Heinz  Paul’s  film  from  1932  was 
41 
42 screened in German cinemas again and several cities hosted a travelling Tannenberg 
43 
44 exhibition, showing the busts of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, numerous books, letters, maps, 
45 
46 and paintings, as well as a model of the East Prussian memorial. The key exhibit and focal 
47 
48 point was a battle relief with multi-coloured lights which allowed the visitors to trace troop 
49 
50 
movements and to understand the course of the campaign.87 These examples hardly provide 
51 
52 
evidence for a ‘Nazification’ of the memory of the victory. Indeed, Tannenberg never played 
54 
55 a particularly prominent role in Nazi ideology and propaganda, even after the outbreak of the 
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3 Second  World War.  The ceremony in celebration of  the twenty-fifth anniversary of  the battle 
4 
5 in late August 1939, which was to involve 10,000 Tannenberg veterans, was cancelled at the 
6 
7 last  minute  (and  the  tented  quarter  quickly  transformed  into  a  camp  for  Polish POWs).88 
8 
9 
Given  its  Eastern  and  anti-Slav  connotations,  Tannenberg  was  used  as  a  code  name  on 
10 
11 
several occasions, such as the false flag attack on the German radio station in Gleiwitz on 1 
13 
14 September 1939 or the mass arrest and executions of Polish nationals by SS Einsatzgruppen. 
15 
16 In summer 1944, it was the namesake for a military operation (or rather defensive line) of 
17 
18 Wehrmacht and multinational Waffen-SS troops who defended the Narva Isthmus against the 
19 
20 Soviet advance into Estonia, Finland, and East Prussia. Not least because of the substantial 
21 
22 involvement of local units on the German side, the Battle of the Tannenberg Line (or the 
23 
24 
Battle  of  the  Blue  Hills,  as  it  is  also  known)  has  since  occupied  an  important  place  in 
26 
Estonian collective  memory.89  In  Germany itself,  on  the  other  hand,  it  seems  that  the 30th 
28 
29 anniversary of the battle of 1914 was not celebrated or commemorated. Tannenberg was 
30 
31 briefly brought up by Hermann Göring in his obituary speech for General Günther Korten, 
32 
33 who had been one of the victims of Claus von Stauffenberg’s assassination attempt on Hitler 
34 
35 in July 1944 and was buried in the Reichsehrenmal: ‘Tannenberg, a bright name in the annals 
36 
37 
of  German  history;  a  symbol  to  which  you  had  often  payed  homage,  my  dear  friend;   a 
39 
symbol how one can defeat superior forces with only few troops, as long as there is a strong 
41 
42 will and a strong faith. If we carry this faith as much in our hearts as you did, the final victory 
43 
44 will and must come.’90 However, it appears that the triumph over the tsarist troops in summer 
45 
46 1914 was not brought up and utilised as a morale-boosting slogan when Russian forces once 
47 
48 again invaded East Prussian territory in January 1945.91 
49 
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3 Tannenberg  featured  the  typical  elements  of  historical  myths:  a  relatively  simple  but 
4 
5 extraordinary story of resilience and ultimate victory over a stereotypical enemy; popularised 
6 
7 in films, literary works, and memorials; ritualised and regularly commemorated in speeches 
8 
9 
and ceremonies on certain anniversaries; and serving an integrative and mobilising function, 
10 
11 
encouraging  future  generations  to  defend  and  carry  on  this  Germanic  mission  against the 
13 
Slavs.92   The   battle  occupied  a   particularly  important  place   in  East   Prussian   collective 
15 
16 memory, as evidenced by the extensive literature dedicated to the experience of the local 
17 
18 population and the unbroken popularity of Paul von Hindenburg. Given the region’s post-war 
19 
20 position as an isolated exclave, Tannenberg here underlined and affirmed East Prussia’s 
21 
22 historic role as German watch in the East.93 While the victory carried much symbolic and 
23 
24 
national  significance  in  the  rest  of  Germany,  too,  it  ultimately  remained  tied  to Prussian- 
26 
conservative   circles   and   admirers   of   Hindenburg’s   ingenious   leadership.   Tannenberg 
28 
29 conveyed a conventional, antiquated image of the war and had little in common with the 
30 
31 experience of many German soldiers, with the horrors of trench warfare and attrition on the 
32 
33 Western front that dominated the German image of the war after 1918. Arguably, it never 
34 
35 gained the same status in German collective memory as the ‘heroic’ but futile assault of 
36 
37 
inexperienced   war  volunteers   near   Langemarck   in   Flanders   –   also  expressing   a more 
39 
‘romantic’ idea of  the war  – or the drawn-out, merciless Battle  of  Verdun.94  The latter myths 
41 
42 revolved around a different generation and set of protagonists: the enthusiastic students in 
43 
44 Belgium and the ascetic-nihilistic (but no less loyal) Frontkämpfer in the trenches of eastern 
45 
46 France. This related to different notions of heroism and sacrifice: while Langemarck stood for 
47 
48 the patriotism of the German youth and its willingness to make sacrifices, Verdun epitomised 
49 
50 
a more silent, robust kind of valour and devotion. These heroic narratives allowed the (male) 
51 
52 
reader to identify with the central characters, which was difficult in the case of the more 
54 
55 complex Tannenberg myth with its references to the medieval past and the world-historical 
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4 
5 the  glorification  of  a  retired  Prusso-German  aristocrat  who  could  hardly  serve  as  the 
6 
7 exemplary hero of soldierly masculinity and bravery in the age of modern and technologized 
8 
9 
mass warfare.95 This may explain the relatively small number of literary and fictional texts on 
10 
11 
Tannenberg – as opposed to the many popular military histories and memoirs of high-ranking 
13 
14 officers –, despite the efforts of a few authors to dissociate the myth from Hindenburg and to 
15 
16 ‘modernise’ the narrative by focusing more on the role of ordinary soldiers and the Volk in 
17 
18 Waffen.96 Ultimately, however, the attempt to liberate the battle from ‘history’ and to subject 
19 
20 the ‘objective truth’ of the event to poetic and dramatic exploration, was a rare exception. 
21 
22 Tannenberg remained a predominantly political myth, promoted and supported by nationalist 
23 
24 
and  conservative  groups  to  challenge  the  territorial changes  and  – as a  defensive  battle on 
26 
German soil – the ‘war guilt lie’ of the Treaty of Versailles. It would be worth investigating 
28 
29 to what extent the notion of the Russian army as a numerically superior but disorganised and 
30 
31 faint-hearted enemy contributed to Hitler’s fateful underestimation of the Soviet Union’s 
32 
33 military potential, and whether many East Prussians really expected another miracle victory 
34 
35 and thus failed to escape in time when the Red Army invaded the region in 1945, as has been 
36 
37 
suggested by some historians.97 In any case, following the destruction of the Reichsehrenmal 
39 
by German pioneers in January 1945,  the  downfall of  the  Third  Reich  and  total defeat,  and 
41 
42 the loss of East Prussia, the Tannenberg of 1914 has outlived its usefulness as a myth in 
43 
44 Germany.98 The medieval victory over the Teutonic Knights at the Battle of Grunwald, on the 
45 
46 other hand, is still widely celebrated as one of the most glorious and significant events in 
47 
48 Polish history – another example for the persistant symbolic and political power of ‘battle 
49 
50 
myths’ in national identity and collective memory. 
51 
52 
53 
54 1 
I should like to thank Bernd Hüppauf, Michael Wintle, Cathie Carmichael, T.G. Otte, as well as  the 
55 
anonymous peer reviewers for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this essay. 
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